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STATE JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN LAND USE:
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE "ENCUMBRANCE"
SAVINGS CLAUSE OF PUBLIC LAW 280
The question of the proper scope of state jurisdiction
over Indian affairs has been a topic of dispute for nearly a
century and a half. Ranging from an attempt to prohibit a
missionary from entering Indian lands,' to a proposed tax
on ski resort equipment belonging to a modern, businessminded Indian tribe,2 states have persisted in challenging
the federal government's claim to plenary jurisdiction over
its Indian wards.
Of significant importance in this jurisdictional dispute
was the passage in 1953 of Public Law 280,' the first cornCopyright@ 1974 by the University of Wyoming
1. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
U.S.
, 93 S.Ct. 1267 (1973).
2. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
3. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 STAT. 588 (1953) as amended by and codified in
25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1970). Public Law 280 in its original form conferred
criminal and civil jurisdiction over actions to which Indians are parties
to five particular states: California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and
Wisconsin. Public Law 90-284 repealed section 7 of Public Law 280 under
which Congress gave its consent to any other state not having such jurisdiction to gain it by proper state initiated action and added an Indian
consent provision. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) is the present embodiment of Congress' consent to the states to assume civil jurisdiction. It provides:
The consent of the United States is hereby given to any State
not having jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians
or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian
country situated within such State to assume, with the consent of
the tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part thereof
which would be affected by such assumption, such measure of
jurisdiction over any or all such civil causes of action arising within such Indian country or any part thereof as may be determined
by such State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction
over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State
that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
country or part theerof as they have elsewhere within that State.
25 U.S.C. § 1326 adds the requirement of Indian consent to this assumption
of state jurisdiction:
State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this sub-chapter with
respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with
respect to both, shall be applicable in Indian country only where
the enrolled Indians within the affected area of such Indian country
accept such jurisdiction by a majority vote of the adult Indians
voting at a special election held for that purpose. The Secretary
of the Interior shall call for such special election under such rules
and regulations as he may prescribe, when requested to do so by
the tribal council or other governing body, or by 20 per centum of
such enrolled adults. (Pub. L. 90-284, title IV, § 406, Apr. 11, 1968,
82 STAT. 80.)
For purposes of this article all references will be to the codified version
of this act as set forth in 25 U.S.C. § 1322 and will be referred to generally
as P.L. 280 unless otherwise appropriate.
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prehensive congressional attempt to turn some jurisdictional
power over to the states. While P.L. 280 provides generally
for the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction by the
states over the affairs of Indians, it was obviously not a
complete abdication of the field by the federal government.
State jurisdiction under this act is limited by a "savings
clause" which provides in essence that nothing contained in
P.L. 280 is to be taken as authorizing "the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of Indian property." 4 (emphasis added.)
Due to recent increased legislation in the areas of zoning,
land use planning, pollution control, and natural resource
development, the need for a clear definition of state authority
over Indian lands is obvious. Furthermore, as states attempt
to legislate in these and similar areas, the question of what
constitutes an "encumbrance" of Indian lands within the
meaning of P.L. 280 may likely arise as the key to the solution of these problems.
The goal of this article, then, is to formulate a proper
approach to the interpretation of the "encumbrance" exclusion.
Two contrary views have recently developed concerning
the meaning of the restriction against encumbering Indian
lands. One of these views is presented in Snohomish v. Seattle
Disposal Co.' There the Supreme Court of Washington held
that "encumbrance" was a broad term including in its
scope actions which merely depreciate property in value,
even though they in no way restrict its alienability. Utilizing
this broad definition, the court held that a zoning ordinance
requiring a land use permit to maintain a sanitary land fill
4. The provision imposing the limitations on such civil jurisdiction set out in
P.L. 280 § 4 (b) is also the present provision as set out in 25 U.S.C. § 1322
(b). That provision states:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including
water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject
to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States;
or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a
manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute, or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer
jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings
or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property
or any interest therein.
5. Snohomish v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash.2d 668, 425 P.2d 22 (1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967).
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could not apply to a sanitary land fill maintained on Indian
land.'
The contrary view is set forth in People v. Rhoades,
where a California court rejected the Snohomish interpretation and applied a more restrictive meaning of "encumbrance," holding that the term should be limited to mortgages, liens, and similar legal claims against property. Using this narrow definition, the court upheld the application
of a state statute requiring the clearing of specified areas
surrounding houses built upon forest lands to an Indian living on reservation lands neighboring the forest!
To determine whether "encumbrance" should be given
the broad interpretation of Snohomish or the narrower one
applied in Rhoades, this article will combine three approaches.
It will first focus upon the legislative history of P.L. 280 in
an attempt to discover the congressional intent behind the
act as a whole. Second, attention will be given to the proper
statutory construction to be applied to the term itself. And
finally, an attempt will be made to put this "savings clause"
into perspective by an analysis of its relationship to other
doctrines relating to the scope of state jurisdiction over
Indian affairs!
P.L. 280:

HIsTOEICAL PERSPECTIVE AND ANALYSIS

Among the considerations which bear upon any effort
to interpret the meaning of "encumbrance" as it is used in
P.L. 280 are the dominant trends embodied in congressional
efforts to resolve the so-called "Indian problem." Faced
with the question of what to do with the conquered Indian
tribes, Congress early recognized that control and regulation of Indian lands were fundamental aspects of any effort
to establish a "civilizing" process."
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 26.
People v. Rhoades, 12 Cal.App.3d 720, 90 Cal.Rptr. 794 (1970).
Id. at 797.
State jurisdiction of Indians in general, the history of federal Indian policy,
developments in the concept of tribal sovereignty and the taxation of
Indians are generally outside the scope of this article. Nevertheless, these
topics, along with a number of other considerations will be discussed to the
extent they relate to the purpose of this article.
10. M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 525 (1973) (hereinafter cited
as PRICE).
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Although a detailed historical analysis of congressional
land policies in regard to Indians is outside the scope of this
article, it is important to note that two contradictory philosophies have been alternately employed by Congress throughout history, and that these philosophical approaches must
influence any consideration of P.L. 280. The earliest viewpoint was grounded on the belief that Indians ought to be
assimilated into the dominant national culture. This assimilationist viewpoint is accurately reflected by a speech delivered by Thomas Jefferson in which he urged a group of
assembled Delawares, Mohicans, and Muncies to forego deer
and buffalo and to cultivate the land and acquire property
in order "to form one people with us, and we shall all be
Americans. "1
This idea of transforming "savages" into "regular"
American citizens led to a series of "termination" acts which
sought to end both the unique status of Indians and the federal government's responsibility for the affairs of Indians."
Typical of these acts is the General Allotment Act of 1887,
also known as the Dawes Act, which provided for the distribution of tribal lands to individual Indians in 160-acre
allotments."5
The alternate philosophy, which has from time to time
been implemented by Congress, is exemplified by the Reorganization Act of 1934 and similar acts which put an end to
the allotment process and attempted to foster tribal selfgovernment.1 4 This contrary view is that, by virtue of the
unique status of Indians as sovereign nations prior to the
Indian wars as recognized by the treaties which ended them,
the Indian stands in a special relationship with the federal
government. Given the fact that the federal government
has conquered the Indians and taken them under its protection, the government owes a duty to protect and assist Indians until such time as they are economically, socially, and
11. W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW 61 (1971).
12. PRICE, supra note 10, at 531.
13. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). Washburn notes the practical effect of the termination-inspired allotment act was to reduce tribal land holdings from
138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million acres in 1934.
14. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1970), popularly known as the Wheeler-Howard Act.
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politically capable of either effective integration into the
dominant culture or successful self-government. 5
Considering the fact that these two contrary philosophies
have both been reflective of the majority sentiment in Congress at various times, it is not surprising that consideration
of the legislative history of P.L. 280 has been largely in
terms of whether the act should be considered a "termination" act or as some sort of protective legislation which
would preserve some form of tribal sovereignty. It has
been argued by some critics that the legislative history of
P.L. 280 clearly demonstrates that termination was not the
purpose of the act.'6 On the other hand, at least one court
appears inclined to the view that the encumbrance restriction
is little more than congressional protection against the Indian profligacy during the process of termination.'
While P.L. 280 may not be solely a termination act, the
legislative history seems to indicate that termination of
federal responsibility was an important purpose. House
Report No. 848, which was adopted by the Senate in Senate
Report No. 699, explains the purpose of the legislation as
viewed by the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs.'" The report states that the committee in cooperation with the Secretary of the Interior has legislated in five
major areas affecting Indians:
This legislation, whether before the House or presently under committee consideration, has two coordinate aims: First, withdrawal of federal responsibility for Indian affairs wherever practicable; and
second, termination of the subjection of Indians to
Federal laws applicable to Indians as such."
It is significant that the other bills which were under consideration by the committee and the Congress at the time
were all clearly termination acts removing federal responsibility and services in a number of areas."
15. PRICE, supra note 10, at 596-99.
16. Israel and Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty, and Economic
Development, 49 N.D.L.R. 267, at 271 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Israel
and Smithson).
17. People v. Rhoades, supra note 7, at 797.
18. H.R. REP. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess 3 (1953)
19. Id.
20. Id. at 5.
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P.L.280 was also characterized as a termination act by
the Secretary of the Interior. As House Report No. 848
observes, officials from the Department of the Interior
were intimately involved in formulating this legislation and
their views are therefore helpful. 1 In his 1953 Annual Report, the Secretary of the Interior discussed the necessity of
terminating federal responsibilities for Indian affairs and
the economic development of 50 million acres of tribal land,
although he cautioned that the process must not operate too
quickly.22 In the 1954 Annual Report, which was the first report issued after the passage of P.L. 280, federal efforts at termination were noted and praised." The language of the
report can leave little doubt that the Department of the Interior considered the act, at least in part, a termination act.
Glenn L. Emmons, Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs observed in that report: "One of the first major developments contributing to a reduction of federal responsibilities in Indian affairs was the passage of Public Law 280,
approved August 15, 1953.'24
It is apparent that these references to termination were
not incidental or unintentional. The prevalent mood of
Congress at the time of the enactment of P.L. 280 was in
favor of a rapid termination of federal involvement in Indian affairs. On July 1, 1952, the House passed a resolution
directing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to
conduct a detailed investigation to determine the ability of
Indian tribes to manage their own affairs without federal
supervision." Just two weeks prior to the approval of P.L.
280, the Senate passed by voice vote House Concurrent Resolution No. 108, which had previously been passed by the
House.2" That resolution declared it to be the policy of the
United States government to make Indians, as rapidly as
possible, "subject to the same laws and entitled to the same
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the
21. Id. at 3.
22.
23.

1953 SEC. INT. ANN. REP. 34-37.
1954 SEC. INT. ANN. REP. 227.

24. Id.
25. H.Res. 706, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 98 CONG. REc. 8782 (1952).
26. 67 Stat. B132 (1953).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol9/iss2/3

6

Hacker et al.: State Jurisdiction over Indian Land Use: An Interpretation of the

1974

COMMENTS

United States and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship." 2 7
From the above it can be seen that P.L. 280 was clearly
motivated at least in part by a termination sentiment. The
concept of surrendering civil and criminal jurisdiction to
the states quite obviously reduces federal responsibility and
eliminates legal distinctions between Indians and non-Indians. The act was written by a committee charged with the
duty of fashioning a termination procedure and passed by a
Congress which had already declared termination to be its
official policy. P.L. 280 was passed, at least to some degree,
as a result of these sentiments.
However, those who argue that the motivation for the
act was not termination, but enhancement of law and order,
may not be entirely incorrect. House Report No. 848 observes:
As a practical matter, the enforcement of law and
order among the Indians in Indian country has been
left to the Indian groups themselves. In many States,
tribes are not adequately organized to perform that
function; consequently, there has been created a
hiatus in law-enforcement authority that could best
be remedied by conferring criminal jurisdiction on
States indicating an ability and willingness to accept
such responsibility. 8
Putting these purposes together, it appears that the
Congress, out of a strong desire to terminate federal responsibilities and in an effort to secure more effective law enforcement in Indian territories, provided for the assumption of
state jurisdiction. If the act as a whole is to be read as a
termination act seeking to grant powers to the state to correct defective legal machinery in the reservations, it would
seem that the act should be construed liberally to afford a
broad grant of power to the states. Such an approach would
dictate a very restricted application of the "encumbrance"
exclusion to situations where the Indian was in need of protection from his own profligacy. Using such an approach,
the view presented in Rhoades would seem proper.
27. 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
28. H.R.REP. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1953).
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Although such a reading of the overall act would be consistent with what is known of the legislative history, it is
not entirely satisfactory or dispositive of the meaning of
"encumbrance." First, although the primary purpose and
tenor of the act are clear, the exact purpose for the withholding of state authority to encumber Indian land is not entirely
clear.
If the act is indeed an effort to provide states with
broad jurisdiction over Indians, there would seem to be little purpose in withholding jurisdiction over taxation, fishing, and alienation and encumbrance of land. Such a reservation either represents a congressional reluctance to afford
complete termination and assimilation in these areas, or a
desire to honor treaties which had generally reserved these
subjects to Indian self-government. The view that these restrictions are a protection of the Indian against his own
profligacy does not entirely fit with the actual language of
the act, inasmuch as the authority which is limited is not the
authority of the Indian to govern his own affairs, but the
authority of the state governments to exercise jurisdiction
in certain areas. If the exclusions were designed to protect
the Indian from anyone, they would appear intended to protect the Indian from the power of state governments. Therefore, although P.L. 280 might be properly characterized as
a termination act, such a characterization does not entirely
resolve the meaning of the encumbrance exclusion.
Second, although an interpretation finding a broad grant
of power to the states might be consistent with the original
national policy behind the act, such a reading is inconsistent
with more modern approaches to the problem. The trend of
modern thinking appears to be away from a complete termination approach and more toward the principles of the 1934
act. In a speech delivered to Congress on July 8, 1970, President Nixon unilaterally declared a change in governmental
policy concerning Indian affairs which he encouraged Congress to follow." In that speech, the President declared:
"Self-determination among Indian people can and must be
29. 116 CONG REC. 23131 (1970).
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encouraged without the threat of eventual termination.""0
The trend of judicial thinking likewise appears to be in
favor of preserving the unique legal status of Indians despite
frequent efforts of state and local governments to assume
control. 1
In short, the termination philosophy which originally
aided in the passage of P.L. 280 is to some extent an anachronism. Given the fact that much of current governmental
policy is aimed at fostering the economic independence of
Indian tribes and promoting tribal self-government, interpreting P.L. 280 in such a way as to decrease Indian autonomy only serves to render governmental policy inconsistent.
Therefore, although the act was originally grounded in
termination theory, that theory has been sufficiently dissipated by recent developments that it ought not to govern the
act. Even if the act as a whole is to be viewed as requiring a
broad grant of power to the states, the limitation on encumbrances should not necessarily be interpreted in such a
manner. There is sufficient ambiguity to require further
consideration of the proper meaning of "encumbrance" and
an examination of the policies which would be furthered by
the different approaches.
ENCUMBRANCE:

DEFINITIONAL ANALYSIS

As pointed out by the discussion of the legislative history of P.L. 280 set out above, congressional intent as to the
characterization to be given this statute as a whole, as well
as the proper interpretation to be given the particular use
of the term "encumbrance" is at least somewhat doubtful.
By approaching the problem from a different angle,
however, i.e., by critically focusing upon the term "encumbrance" used in this statute in the light of a unique maxim
of statutory construction applicable to "Indian legislation"
50. Id.
31. State efforts at securing jurisdiction through various procedures have
been generally refuted. See, Israel and Smithson, supra note 16, at 267-70;
93 S.Ct. 1257
U.S- -------MeClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona,
(1973).
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and by analytically comparing and weighing the definitions
given this term by various courts in both "Indian" and
"non-Indian" contexts, perhaps a better understanding of
the congressional purpose in employing the word "encumbrance" can be gained.
The most relevant section of P.L. 280's "exclusionary
savings clause" provides:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to
any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or community that
is held in trust by the United States or is subject to
a restriction against alienation imposed by the
United States.8" (Emphasis added).
Assuming P.L. 280 was intended as a rather broad grant
of jurisdiction to the states in at least some areas, the importance of the above clause lies in the fact that it stands
as a delineation of the boundaries of that grant. Furthermore, while the limitations imposed by the prohibitions on
state jurisdiction over "alienation" and "taxation" of Indian property seem, on their face at least," to be rather selfevident, the scope of the limitation imposed by the term
"encumbrance" seems inherently unclear. Yet, because of
the potential variety of proposed state actions which eventually might fall within the penumbra of this restrictive
phraseology, a clear definition of its scope is paramount to
any rational understanding of the present status of the tripartite federal-state-Indian jurisdictional relationship.
Standing alone, the term "encumbrance"
jected to such dictionary definitions as:

has been sub-

A burden or charge upon property: a claim or
lien upon an estate that may diminish its value:
specif.; any interest or right in land existing to the
diminution of the value of the fee but not preventing the passing of the fee by conveyance. 4
32. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1970).
33. This is not to indicate that these other terms have not also been the focus
of a good deal of controversy. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
supra note 2. These problems, however, are beyond the scope of the
present article.
34. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 747 (1971).
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Black's Law Dictionary describes it as "[a]ny right to, or
interest in, land which may subsist in another to the diminution of its value, but consistent with the passing of fee." 35 It
cites case law for various examples, including:
A claim, lien, charge, or liability attached to
and binding real property.... An incumbrance may
be a mortgage ... ; a judgment lien ... ; an attachment ... ; an inchoate right of dower... ; a mechanics
lien... ; a lease . . .; restriction in deed.. .; encroachment of a building... ; an easement or right of way
...; accrued and unpaid taxes...; the statutory right
of redemption . . .
Courts seem to have some difficulty in applying these
standard definitions to actual situations. The two leading
cases in interpretating the meaning of the word encumbrance
in the "savings clause" are Snohomish County v. Seattle
Disposal Co.,, 7 and People v. Rhoades. 8
Snohomish presents the view that this term should be
constructed in a broad sense. "This court has said in the
past that any 'burden upon land depreciative of its value,
such as a lien, easement, or servitude, which, though adverse
to the interest of the landowner, does not conflict with his
conveyance of the land in fee' constitutes an encumbrance. ""
The court determined that the application of a zoning ordinance which would limit the commercial use of the land in
question definitely reduced its value and therefore should be
considered an encumbrance within the scope of P.L. 280.
This decision would imply that any restriction on land held
in trust by the United States for Indians which would be
adverse to their interests and diminish the value of the property to them would be invalid under this limitation.
Judge Hale, in voicing the dissent in that case, set forth
the opposite view in interpreting the meaning of encumbrance
for purposes of P.L. 280. le used the term as a word of art
85.
36.
37.
88.
39.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 908 (4th ed. 1968).
Id.
Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., supra note 5.
People v. Rhoades, supra note 7.
Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., supra note 5, at 26, citing a
prior Washington case Hebb v. Severson, 32 Wash.2d 159, 167, 201 P.2d
156, 160 (1948).
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stating, "The term 'encumbrance' should be given its more
definitive and precise meaning-one denoting a burden on
the land and affecting the title thereto or one impairing the
power of alienation such as a mortgage, lien, easement, lease,
or other disability to fee ownership."" He stated that case
law has held that municipal restrictions on the use of land
are not encumbrances for purposes of letting a purchaser
avoid the contract claiming title is unmerchantable because
of the restriction.4 ' In fact, the dissent argued, "although
zoning laws do impair the uses to which one may put his
have not been deemed an enland, from their inception they
42
cumbrance on real estate."

The dissent in Snohomish espoused the theory upon
which People v. Rhoades was decided. That case stressed
the interpretation of encumbrance given by the Snohomish
dissent, adding that even a definition as broad as the one
used by the majority opinion of Snohomish would not cover
the particular California land use law applied to Rhoades
because, "as we view it ,it would not be a burden upon
Rhoades' land 'depreciative of its value' to require that it
be so maintained as to not be a hazard to forest lands in
This holding
general and to Rhoades' land in particular."
rejected the contention made in the brief of amicus curiae
to the California Court of Appeals that:
Encumbrances need not be financial burdens,
however. California Courts have previously defined
encumbrances as including whatever obstructs and
impairs a traditional Indian's use of his land. Accordingly-under the rule requiring federal laws to
be construed in the Indian's favor-section 4291
must be ruled an encumbrance that cannot be applied
to Indian reservations. 4
These two opposing cases represent the problem created
by the limitations in P.L. 280 which is, in the words of the
Rhoades court, "one of statutory interpretation. By the use
of the word 'encumbrance' in 18 United States Code, section
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., supra note 5, at 28.
Id. citing Lohmeyer v. Bower 170 Kan. 442, 227 P.2d 102 (1951).
Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., supra note 5, at 28.
People v. Rhoades, supra note 7, at 797.
Brief for Amicus Curiae at 5, People v. Rhoades, 8upra note 7.
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1162, what did Congress intend ?'"'"It is asserted here that
for the several reasons to be discussed below, the word "encumbrance should be construed broadly and in a light most
favorable to the Indians. This conclusion is reached upon
examination of the clause in its statutory context, evaluation
of the two opposing views and traditional attitudes of statutory construction toward the Indian people.
1. The broad view put forth in Snohomish actually adheres
more closely to the language used in the standard definitions of "encumbrance." In viewing that language objectively, it is not difficult to view a restriction against the use
of land as being depreciative of its value. As the brief of
amicus cuiae in the Rhoades case contended, depreciation
in value need not be necessarily in monetary terms." Certainly the inability to use the land as desired would lessen,
if not negate, the value of that land to the owner. In light of
the current attempts of the Indian peoples to maintain their
culture and heritage it would be ludicrous to argue that the
only value of their land to them is in its sale price or market
value.
2. The term should be viewed in its statutory context. The
phrasing of the limitation in P.L. 280 in its "trilogy" form
would indicate that each term is intended to cover an area
over which states do not assume jurisdiction. If the narrow
interpretation of "encumbrance" is followed as espoused by
the Rhoades case and the dissent in Snohomish, then the word
would describe only restrictions on land which affect the title
or impair the power of alienation. 7 With such an interpretation the "trilogy" might as well be "alienation, alienation
or taxation" rather than "alienation, encumbrance or taxation." If the narrow interpretation is applied, and encumbrance is construed as including only restrictions affecting
alienability, the language of the statute becomes redundant.
The court in Rhoades seemed to think that the fact "alienation" and "encumbrance" were used in the same series indicated the intention for them to be synonymous in meaning."'
45.
46.
47.
48.

People v. Rhoades, supra note 7, at 796.
Brief for Amicus Curiae at 5, supra note 44.
Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., supra note 5, at 28.
People v. Rhoades, 8upra note 7, at 797.
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This is no more logical than to say "taxation" also means
"alienation" because it is in the same series as well. As the
court in Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San
Diego pointed out, "In construing a statute, courts whenever
possible avoid a construction which renders part of the statute
superfluous."" The use of "alienation" would render "encumbrance as useless surplusage if the narrow interpretation
is applied.
The court in Rincon argued:
Later in the same statute it is provided that
nothing in the section "shall authorize regulation of
the use of such property in a manner inconsistent
with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or
with any regulation made pursuant thereto." If all
state laws regulating were made inapplicable by
the earlier language describing encumbrances, then
this language would be totally unneeded."
Upon further examination of that language this phrase is
also found: "or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to
adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest
therein."" (Emphasis added). If the rationale of the Rincon
court is followed then the use of the term "alienation" in
any sense would render this language unnecessary as well.
Carrying the Rincon analysis through, it would seem that all
of the language of the second part would become superfluous.
As the language pertaining to regulation of the use of property relates to encumbrance, so does the language pertaining
to ownership of such property or interest therein relate to
alienation. It would seem more appropriate to attribute
these provisions as definitions of the terms in the first part
of the limitation. The second part of the section would seem
to be specific enumerations of the limitations imposed by the
broad terms "alienation" and "encumbrance."
The definite correlation of these two phrases to "alienation" and "encumbrance" separately would indicate that
49. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371,
376 (S.D. Cal. 1971), citing Consolidated Flower Shipments Inc. v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, 205 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1953).
50. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, eupra note 49.
51. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1970).
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these words were intended, in fact, to be interpreted separately, each with its own precise meaning. Only through the
broad interpretation of encumbrance can this be effectuated.
3. Throughout the case law on the relationship of the
United States with the Indian people one concept has remained clear. That is that provisions in federal Indian laws
must be construed broadly and in a light most favorable to
Indians. Both Snohomish and Rhoades concede this fact.
Snohomish applies the concept directly to their application,
citing Squire v. Capoeman,"2 saying,
In that case the Court concluded that the words
'charge or encumbrance,' as they appear in the General Allotment Act of 1887, should be interpreted
broadly, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the Indians for whose benefit that legislation, as well
as the legislation before us, was intended. We, therefore, hold that Snohomish County Zoning Ordinance
No. 7 ...

constitutes an encumbrance ...

.91~53

The court in Rhoades begins its analysis of the word
"encumbrance" with this language, "Starting with the premise that this law like all Federal Indian laws must be construed in the manner most favorable to Indians.' "5 (Emphasis added). The court then proceeds to interpret "encumbrance" in its narrow sense and in the manner most unfavorable to the Indians involved. The Squire case cited in Snohomish makes it quite obvious that the term "encumbrance"
is to be construed broadly. Since Rhoades acknowledges this
position, it seems strange that it would then turn its back,
construing the term narrowly. The recent 1973 Supreme
Court case of McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona" indicates that this concept is very much in effect and
adhered to today.
It is circumstances such as these which have led
this Court in interpreting Indian treaties, to adopt
the general rule that "Doubtful expressions are to
be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless
52. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956)
53. Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., supra note 5, at 26.
54. People v. Rhoades, supra note 7, at 796, citing Elser v. Gill Net Number
One, 246 Cal. App. 2d 30, 36, 54 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1966).
65. McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, U.S. ___, 93 S.Ct.
1257 (1973).
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people who are the wards of the nation, dependent
upon its protection and good faith.'"
That the use of "encumbrance" in P.L. 280 is such a "doubtful expression" is not considered here, but as such it should
then be resolved in favor of the Indians.
4. The dissent in Snohomish argued that "were zoning
regulations regarded as encumbrances on land in the legal
sense, the courts at their inception would have held them to
constitute a taking or damaging of real estate under the
state's power of eminent domain and not simply an expression of the police power. '"" That opinion and the majority
opinion in Rhoades argued that even if a regulation concerning land use would impair the use of the land to the Indian
owner, it should be upheld because Indians are entitled to
equal protection of the laws. This would mean that they
should be subjected to the duties as well as enjoy the rights
and privileges. As the majority in Snohomish indicated,
"We have already determined that this state has no jurisdiction to control either directly or indirectly the use of the
Indian lands in question. Where there is no jurisdiction,
there can be no denial of equal protection.""8
It should be noted at this point that a substantial portion
of the argument in Rhoades and in the Snohomish dissent
was dedicated to the idea that there was a necessity for the
application of police power. This necessitates pointing out
that some regulations can be imposed through other statutory provisions. 25 U.S.C. section 231 provides that a state
has jurisdiction to inspect and regulate health, sanitation,
and related matters on Indian tribal lands. 9 25 C.F.R. section 1.4 provides that state laws which limit, govern, regulate
or control the use of real property are inapplicable to lands
held in trust for Indians unless the Secretary of the Interior
makes them applicable." In Donahue v. California Justice
6 1 a 1971 California
Ct. for Klamath Trinity Judicial District,
56. Id. at 1263, citing Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930).
57. Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., supra note 5, at 28
58. Id. at 27.
59. 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1970).
60. 25 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1973).
61. Donahue v. California Justice Ct. for Klamath Trinity Judicial District,
25 Cal.App. 3d 557, 93 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1971).
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case, dealing with a fishing violation on Indian land by an
Indian, the court concludes, "(t)he facts presently before us
do not indicate the necessity for the legitimate exercise of
police power, as in Rhoades."" This expression that Rhoades
presented a "necessity" for police power would indicate
that perhaps the court in Rhoades could have based its decision that state power existed to deal with the problem presented in that case upon a broad reading of 25 U.S.C. section
231 rather than hinging its decision upon an unnecessarily
restrictive reading of "encumbrance."
As to 25 C.F.R. section 1.4, F.R. Doc. 65-7193, 30 Fed.
Reg. 8722 conferred the required consent of the Secretary of
the Interior for the state of California to apply its laws, ordinances, regulations, etc. to Indian lands, but only as to Indian
land that is leased or held under similar agreement. Therefore, this provision is applicable only to leased land and not
to tribal land occupied by Indians."
It can be seen, therefore, that some arguments for state
regulation of land use may be based on other means of acquiring jurisdiction than P.L. 280. These, however, are restricted in their scope by the above described limitations just
as P.L. 280 is restricted by its "savings clause."
5. A brief look at the Supreme Court's treatment of other
limiting language of P.L. 280 might be helpful in determining how "encumbrance" should be interpreted. In the limitation under the criminal jurisdiction section the following
language is found:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real property,.. . or shall deprive any Indian or any Indian
tribe, band or community of any right, privilege, or
immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement,
or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof. 4
In the McClanahan case," where the state was attempting to
impose a personal income tax on a reservation Indian whose
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 314.
Brief for Amicus Curiae at 8, People v. Rhoades, aupra note 7.
25 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1970).
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, supra note 55.
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income was derived from reservation sources, the state was
found to be unable to enforce that tax. That decision was
not based squarely on P.L. 280 since the state had not adopted
that provision. By way of footnote that court indicated, "We
do not suggest that Arizona would necessarily be empowered
to impose this tax had it followed the procedures outlined in
25 U.S.C. section 1322 et. seq. Cf. 25 U.S.C. section 1322
(b). That question is not presently before us and we express
no views on it."66 The Washington Supreme Court in Tonasket v. State,6 where P.L. 280 was in effect, held a state cigarette tax applicable to an Indian selling cigarettes on Indian
land. This was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court simply stated:
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is vacated, and the case is remanded to that
court for reconsideration in light of.

.

. this Court's

decision in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Con, 93 S. Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed. 2d ....
r'n, .... U.S .....
(1973) .s
This gives rise to the implication that McClanahan would
then, in fact, be decided the same under P.L. 280, the state
being unable to impose the tax.
The Supreme Court, in the 1973 case Department of
Game of the State of Washington v. The Puyallup Tribe, 9
reversed the lower court decision that Washington State
Game Department's regulation against net fishing was binding against the Puyallups. The court, through Mr. Justice
Douglas, delivered the unanimous decision that the rights
of the Indians as enumerated under the applicable treaty
should be accommodated and the regulation should not be
applicable to them. It is significant to note the Court's discussion of the police power. It stated:
We do not imply that these
sist down to the very last steel
Rights can be controlled by the
species; and the time may come
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1265.
Tonasket v.
Tonasket v.
Department
42 U.S.L.W.

fishing rights perhead in the river.
need to conserve a
when the life of a

State, 70 Wash.2d 607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971).
U.S.... , 93 S.Ct. 1941 (1973).
State,
of Game of the State of Washington v. The Payallup Tribe,
4001 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973).
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steel head is so precarious in a particular stream
that all fishing should be banned until the species
regains assurance of survival. The police power of
the State is adequate to prevent the steel head from
following the fate of the passenger pigeon; and the
Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to
pursue the last living steel head until it enters their
nets."0 (emphasis added)
Such language seems to approach the "necessity"
power concept expressed in Donahue.1

of police

These decisions indicate that the courts have generally
interpreted the other limitations in P.L. 280 in favor of the
Indians. The "encumbrance" limitation should then be likewise interpreted, as the court did in Snohonvish.
6. Congressional intent is all important in interpreting
this provision. A footnote in McClanahan2 implied that the
court still accepts the general principle that when Congress
intends to grant states specific jurisdiction over the affairs
of Indians on reservation it will do so expressly. The rationale of requiring a clear expression of intent is explained in
Bennett County, South Dakota v. United States: 3
To assure the utmost fairness in transactions between the United States and its Indian wards, any
intent to deprive Indian tribes of their rights in land,
or otherwise bring about the extinguishment of Indian title, either by grants in abrogation of existing
treaties or through other congressional legislation
must be clearly and unequivocally stated and language appearing in such grants and statutes is not
to be construed to the prejudice of the Indians."
(emphasis added)
Since there is no such clear and unequivocal language granting jurisdiction over land use under P.L. 280 and since a
narrow construction of the savings clause would appear to
be to the prejudice of the Indians, it would seem that a broad
interpretation should be employed.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 4003.
See text supra p. 17.
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, supra note 55, at 1264 n,13.
Bennett County, South Dakota v. United States, 394 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 11-12.
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Although the considerations reviewed above provide substantial cause for adopting the Snohomish definition of encumbrance, an evaluation of the question solely in terms of
definitions and the rationale of related cases, even considered
in light of the legislative-historical analysis provided in the
first section of this article, would be incomplete. The broader
context of the effect of P.L. 280 as related to other jurisdictional bases must be considered in order to arrive at a comprehensive view of the present scope of state jurisdiction
over Indian lands, and the ramifications of either a broad
or narrow definition of "encumbrance."
PUBLIC LAW

280 AND THE "ENCUMBRANCE"

SAVINGS CLAUSE

VIS-A-VIS CONTEMPORARY JURISDICTIONAL DOCTmIES.

While the primary purpose of this article is to focus
upon the term "encumbrance" in P.L. 280 and to suggest
its proper interpretation, this task cannot be carried on in
isolation. To appreciate the significance of this savings
clause it is necessary to look at the question of state jurisdiction over Indians on a somewhat broader level. In recent
years, the "official word" to the 'states as to their proper
jurisdictional role regarding Indians has been embodied
basically in three commands. First, as discussed above, P.L.
280 stands as the latest official position taken by Congress
as to the extent of state jurisdiction. The source of the second
and third directives has been the United States Supreme
Court which has attempted to interpret Congressional intent
in this area in two landmark decisions: Williams v. Lee,"5
and McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona. 6
Paradoxical situations have arisen, however, when states
have attempted in good faith to follow these directives. For
instance, when states have attempted to rely upon Williarms
as a basis for their jurisdictional claim they have been told
they should have relied upon P.L. 280." When they have
attempted to rely upon P.L. 280, however, they have been
told that they are still without jurisdictional power under
75. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
76. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, supra note 55.
77. Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
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McClanahan.8 Yet, McClanahan can be read as implying
that the state could have relied upon Williams as a basis for
jurisdictional power in the first place."
It is the purpose of this discussion, then, to attempt an
explanation of how this paradoxical merry-go-round arose,
how these three directives to the states can be harmonized,
and how "encumbrance" might fit into the total scheme of
state jurisdiction over Indian lands.
In 1959, the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee8" held
that an Arizona state court did not have jurisdiction to decide
a suit brought by a non-Indian against a Navajo Indian for
a debt arising out of a transaction which took place on the
Indian reservation. This case has generally been noted as
espousing two principles: first, it supposedly reaffirmed the
Court's position taken in Worcester v. Georgia8 that Congress holds plenary jurisdiction as to Indian affairs and
consequently that states have no jurisdiction over Indians
except that expressly granted; second, the Court formulated,
perhaps unintentionally, the following so-called "infringement" test as to state jurisdiction: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress the question has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."s"
A brief review of the problems inherent in attempting to
rationalize Williams with P.L. 280 follows, however, in summary, it can be observed that the basic difficulties are these:
first, there would appear to be an inconsistency between the
adherence in Williams to the basic philosophy of Worcester
v. Georgia on the one hand and its own definition of state
power on the other; second, Williams apparently did not accept P.L. 280 (at least as to those states where its acceptance
is optional) as a governing act of Congress, yet the most
recent Supreme Court cases would view it as clearly such an
act; third, the fact that these recent cases have found that
P.L. 280 is a governing act of Congress and hence the sole
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Tonasket v. State, supra note 68.
State Ex Rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, 512 P.2d 1292 (Mont. 1973).
Williams v. Lee, supra note 75.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
Williams v. Lee, supra note 75, at 220.
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basis for jurisdiction places those states which have not yet
acted under P.L. 280 or cannot obtain tribal consent in the
paradoxical position of being stripped of jurisdiction by an
act that was intended to grant more jurisdiction to the states.
The apparent inconsistency between the two principles
enumerated in Williams is readily observable. On the one
hand, the Court ostensibly adheres to the Worcester principle
that there can be absolutely no state jurisdiction over Indians
unless expressly granted by Congress, while on the other
hand, a plain reading of the test formulated by the Court
would lead to an inference that states have some "inherent"
type of jurisdiction over Indians limited only to the extent it
comes into conflict with a vague notion of tribal sovereignty.
Beyond this primary difficulty, however, the waters are
further muddied by any attempt to rationally harmonize
Williams with P.L. 280. If the infringement test is truly a
recognition of some non-statutory power in state courts over
Indians, it might be argued in states which have not adopted
P.L. 280 that the infringement test still applies and that
these courts are free to exercise jurisdiction over Indians so
long as there is no interference with tribal sovereignty. This
was in fact the argument made in Kennerly v. District Court
of Montanas and McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of
Arizona.84
In Kennerly, the Montana legislature, pursuant to the
1953 version of P.L. 280, had extended its criminal jurisdiction to some Indian tribes, but had not taken steps to extend
civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indians on the Blackfoot
reservation. Relying on Williams, the state maintained that
its courts nevertheless had jurisdiction to hear a suit on a
debt arising from a transaction on the reservation, due to an
enactment of the Blackfoot Tribal Council (not a consent
sufficient under P.L. 280) which authorized the state concurrent jurisdiction over all suits wherein the defendant was
a member of the tribe. Despite the fact that Montana had
not gained jurisdiction over Indians pursuant to P.L. 280,
the state supreme court viewed this action by the Tribal
83. Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, supra note 77.
84. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, supra note 55.
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Council as an alternative basis for the assertion of state civil
jurisdiction, for under Williams there could surely be no infringement of tribal sovereignty where the tribe itself had
agreed to the state's assumption of jurisdiction.
Similarly, in McClanahan it was argued that, even
though it had not taken advantage of P.L. 280, the state of
Arizona still had power to impose a state income tax on an
Indian's personal income earned totally on a reservation,
since such tax under Williams, arguably at least, would not
infringe on tribal sovereignty but would rather merely infringe on plaintiff's rights as an individual Navajo Indian.
In both Kennerly and McClanahanthe Supreme Court's
answer to these contentions of inherent state jurisdiction
arising from Williams was the same. In both cases the court
apparently recognized the validity of the infringement test
but held that the test was not applicable by its own terms
since P.L. 280 was in fact a "governing act of Congress."
These cases therefore require that for a state to assume any
jurisdiction over Indians it must follow precisely the procedure set out in P.L. 280.
The court in Kennerly implies that even in Williams
there was a tacit recognition that P.L. 280 was a governing act
of Congress. 5 However, if it was clearly apparent that P.L.
280 was a governing act of Congress it is worth pondering
why the Williams court did not base its decision on that
ground, rather than going on to find "there can be no doubt
that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the
Indians to govern themselves." 86 Under the rationale in
Kennerly and McClanahan the fact that P.L. 280 was in
existence and that Arizona had not assumed jurisdiction
under it should have been dispositive of the case without any
85. The court was apparently referring to the following passage: "In a general statute (P.L. 280) Congress did express its willingness to have any
State assume jurisdiction over reservation Indians if the State Legislature
or the people vote affirmatively to accept such responsibility. To date,
" Williams v. Lee, supra note
Arizona has not accepted jurisdiction .
75, at 222.
86. William v. Lee, supra note 75, at 223.
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need to arrive at the question of whether the state action
did in fact interfere with tribal sovereignty.
In McClanahanand Kennerly it seems apparent that the
Court is holding P.L. 280 out to be a governing act of Congress for all states whether they have sought jurisdiction
under it or not. In this regard it is interesting to note that the
Williams court classified those parts of P.L. 280 which directly granted jurisdiction to California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin as examples of Congress expressly
granting to states the jurisdiction which Worcester had denied, 7 (and presumably constituting, therefore, governing
acts for the purpose of the infringement test) while it separated out those parts of P.L. 280 which presented a choice to the
states to assume jurisdiction by enactment of legislation or
change in constitution and classified these merely as examples
of Congress' willingness to "have any State assume jurisdiction .... "" From this classification differentiation and
from the fact that the Williams court went on to look at
whether tribal sovereignty had been infringed, it would seem
that the Williams court did not view the general enabling
act section of P.L. 280 as a "governing act of Congress."
Furthermore, if P.L. 280 is a governing act of Congress,
then a paradox is presented. The purpose of P.L. 280 was
to grant more power to the states over Indian affairs; yet
if it is a governing act of Congress, those states which cannot get Indian consent to the assumption of jurisdiction have
less jurisdiction than they possessed prior to the passage of
the act. If P.L. 280 is a governing act of Congress, then
whatever jurisdiction was claimed on the basis of Williams
has disappeared.8 9
It has been suggested9 0 that some of the problems noted
above can be resolved by the following analysis. First, the
court in Williams never intended that the test suggested in
that case be used to imply that there existed any sort of
"inherent" state power over Indians. Rather, the test was
87. Id. at 221.
88. Id. at 222.
89. Sullivan, State Civil Power over Reservation Indians, 33 MONT. L. REV.
291 (1972).
90. Israel and Smithson, supra note 16.
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simply meant to be reflective of the principle that state
courts may have jurisdiction over peripheral Indian affairs
such as suits by Indians against outsiders, or suits between
non-Indians who committed crimes against each other on a
reservation 9 and was never meant to be taken to mean that
states may have power to apply their laws to Indians on reservations even if there was no interference with tribal sovereignty. Second, as to the latter power, the Williams court, it
is argued, never challenged the fact that this could come
only by way of an express grant from Congress. Acceptance
of this view would clear up at least two of the problems
pointed out above. It would mean, first of all, that the Williams court's acceptance of Worcester was not in conflict
with its proposed test since the latter, being applicable only
to the non-internal affairs of Indians, is consistent with the
notion that states have no jurisdiction over Indian affairs
unless expressly granted. Furthermore, this analysis would
also solve the seemingly paradoxical situation of P.L. 280
taking away power from those states which have not or could
not obtain Indian consent, since if Williams v. Lee did not
recognize any inherent state power to control internal Indian
affairs, then there was no power for P.L. 280 to take away.
Under this view, P.L. 280 is the only logical basis for a state's
claim to jurisdiction over the internal affairs of Indians.
While the above interpretation of the Williams v. Lee
test is probably theoretically the most logical since it does
not call for a break with the Worcester principle of "no
jurisdiction unless expressly granted" which the Williams
court claimed to adhere to, it is simply not the interpretation which the most recent Supreme Court and state supreme
court decisions have given it. Therein lies the basis of the
current conceptual difficulties in harmonizing the "infringement" test with P.L. 280.
As pointed out above, if the Williams court truly meant
to say that its test should never be interpreted as recognizing
the possibility of state power existing to regulate internal
Indian affairs unless that power was expressly granted (re91. These two situations were in fact listed as examples of state action permissible under the infringement test. Williams v. Lee, supra note 75, at
220.
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gardless of whether such exercise of power would interfere
with tribal sovereignty), then why didn't the Court decide
the case on this basis? This case clearly involved "the affairs
of Indians on a reservation" and could have been summarily
dismissed since the state lacked any specific grant of power
from Congress. Instead, however, the court insisted upon
holding the challenged state action up to the test of infringement, thereby basing its opinion on the fact that the state
action infringed on tribal sovereignty.
Admittedly, it might seem rather inconsequential whether
a proposed state action is struck down due to its being an
infringement on tribal sovereignty (and thereby failing the
Williams test) or whether it is struck down because there has
not been an express grant of power which is needed for any
state action affecting Indians on reservations (and thereby
failing without regard to the Williams test). For all practical purposes, even if the Williams test is given its plain
meaning9 2 (i.e., that any state action is permissible so long as
it does not interfere with tribal sovereignty) any state action
which in fact attempted to control internal Indian affairs
would not only fail for lack of "express authority" under the
one view, but would also undoubtedly fail the Williams test
as being an "infringement" on tribal sovereignty.
If, then, in practical terms, the state will be able to exercise no greater jurisdiction under one theory than the other,
why make the distinction? The answer has been alluded to
above but seems worth reiterating here. If the Williams v.
Lee test was not a recognition of any possible "inherent" or
"reserved" state jurisdiction over internal Indian affairs
then it should be clear to the states that this case was not a
departure from the traditional Worcester rule. Once it is
admitted, then, that Williams v. Lee did not recognize such
jurisdiction, P.L. 280 can logically be viewed as the first and
only offer by Congress of this type of jurisdiction to the
92. See, for example, Frankfurter's opinion in Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S.
60, 75 (1961): "These decisions indicate that even on reservations state
laws may be applied to Indians unless such application would interfere
with reservation self-government or impair a right granted or reserved by
federal law."
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states and they cannot complain of being forced to follow its
procedures.
On the other hand, if the Williams v. Lee test is viewed
as a recognition of the propriety of any state action which
does not infringe on tribal sovereignty, i.e., that it was somehow a change from the traditional rule of Worcester, then,
even though this "inherent" state power is practically limited
to jurisdiction over the non-internal affairs of Indians, some
states are likely to feel that Williams v. Lee is another route
to gaining state jurisdiction apart from P.L. 280 and will
resent any attempted assertion that adoption of P.L. 280 is
an absoute prerequisite to state jurisdiction. Under this
view it is hard for the states to believe that the mere availability of P.L. 280 was intended to undercut the power that
the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee apparently recognized
they possessed.
8 gave
The Supreme Court in Kennerly and McClanahanP
little in the way of guidance to the states to get around the
conceptual difficulties outlined above. In Kennerly, for instance, it was clearly stated that P.L. 280 was a governing
act of Congress and was the only avenue open for the states
to obtain jurisdiction over the internal affairs of Indians.
However, by reason of the court's failure to adequately explain away the apparent recognition of "inherent" powers
under Williams v. Lee and why this test no longer applied
even to states which had not adopted P.L. 280, this area of
the law was left in a confused condition. Three Montana
cases decided subsequently to Kennerly reflect this confusion
most clearly.

Shortly after the Kennerly decision the Montana Supreme Court seemed quite content, in Crow Tribe of Indians
v. Deernose," to accept the United States Supreme Court's
decision on its face, for without any discussion of Williams
v. Lee it simply held:
It is abundantly clear that state court jurisdiction in Indian affairs on reservations does not
Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, supra note 77; McClanahan v.
State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, supra note 55.
94. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Deernose, 487 P.2d 1133 (Mont. 1971).

93.
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exist in the absence of an express statutory grant
of such jurisdiction by Congress together with strict
compliance with the provisions of such grant . . .
(citing Kennerly) where as here, Congress has not
expressly granted jurisdiction to state courts except
under procedures specified in (P.L. 280) . . . and
where the procedures . . have (not) been complied
with, state court jurisdiction over real estate mortsitugage foreclosure actions on Indian trust lands
.5
ate on Indian Reservations does not exist
Two years later, in Security State Bank v. Pierre,0 the
court, faced with a debt action arising from a transaction
which took place within the exterior boundaries of the Flathead Indian Reservation, held that the state court did not
have jurisdiction since under the Kennerly ruling the state
had not taken action sufficient to obtain jurisdiction. However, instead of simply holding that Kennerly was controlling, the court could not resist the temptation of slipping
something extra into its conclusion: "Kennerly is controlling and the state cannot exercise civil jurisdiction where it
interferes with the self-government of the Flathead Tribe...
(citing Williams v. Lee) (emphasis added)." 9"
There seems to be at least an inference here that even
under Kennerly the state court could have had jurisdiction
if it had not been for the fact that this action would have
infringed on tribal sovereignty.
Finally, at the time the Montana court decided State Ex
Bel. Iron Bear v. District Court, s which was decided after
McClanahan,the circle seems to have become complete. For,
ignoring its lesson in Kennerly,9 0 the court once again attempted to base its jurisdiction on Williams v. Lee rather
than upon P.L. 280:
The guidelines are set down in Williams and as
long as the state does not violate those guide lines
and does not attempt to exercise jurisdiction over
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1136.
Security State Bank v. Pierre,511 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1973).
Id. at 329-30.
State Ex Rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, supra note 79.
The dissenting Justice pointed out the fallacy of the majority's reasoning.
Note his caveat: "continued adherence to the Williams test has previously
resulted in reversals in the judgments of this court." Id. at 1299.
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areas of the law where there is either a governing Act
of Congress or an infringement on reservation selfgovernment, it may continue to exercise jurisdicthe residual jurisdictionof the state over
tion ...'0o

divorces on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation remains valid.1 ' (emphasis added)
If the United States Supreme Court truly is of the opinion that P.L. 280 is today the only avenue to state assumption
of jurisdiction over Indian affairs it has clearly failed to
make manifest this opinion to the state courts.
To clear up the difficulties noted above, the following
scheme is suggested. The Supreme Court should clearly state
that Williams, consistent with the Worcester principle, never
recognized the possibility of inherent or residual powers in
the states to control internal Indian affairs, that any other
reading of Williams is wrong, and that therefore the only
avenue open to the states to acquire the jurisdiction denied
Worcester is by means of P.L. 280.
Instead of this, the Supreme Court in McClanahan
merely added more confusion to the area by its simple dismissal of Williams v. Lee on the basis that P.L. 280 was a
governing act of Congress. By not directly getting rid of
the notion of "inherent" state power over the internal Indian
affairs under Williams, the Court has encouraged those
states which have not adopted P.L. 280, such as Arizona in
McClanahanand Montana in Iron Bear, to attempt to assume
jurisdiction via Williams by simply weaseling around the
tribal sovereignty bar of the infringement test, rather than
by taking affirmative action under P.L. 280.
For P.L. 280 to logically stand as a governing act of
Congress in a comprehensive scheme of federal-state-tribal
jurisdiction, as was apparently the intent of Congress at the
time of its passage, there should be allowed to exist no other
"short cut" avenues for the state to assert its jurisdiction,
especially under a test relying on ad hoc determinations of
"infringement on tribal sovereignty," a test which would
allow no predictability as to the extent of state jurisdiction.
100. Id. at 1297.
101. Id. at 1298-99.
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Finally, to put the above analysis into perspective as to
the "encumbrance" restriction in P.L. 280, one further point
must be made. It seems clear that it was the intent of Congress that P.L. 280 take a position as the exclusive means of
acquiring state jurisdiction over Indian affairs. Furthermore, while not stating the proposition very clearly, the
Supreme Court in Kennerly and McClanahan seems to have
accepted P.L. 280 as it was intended, i.e., as the first broad
grant of jurisdiction over Indian affairs to the states to the
exclusion of state claims of residual power under Williams
v. Lee. However, if the Williams test is now no longer applicable (either because P.L. 280 is a "governing Act of Congress" and hence the test is no longer applicable by its own
terms or because the test itself never recognized the possibility of residual state powers over internal Indian affairs)
then it must be recognized that the demise of this test did
more than bring to an end a possible ground for the assertion
of state jurisdiction; it also meant the end of an "outside
limit" on the exercise of state jurisdiction. Loosely paraphrased, Williams has usually been taken to stand for the
proposition that the states could, in the absence of congressional acts, exercise any jurisdiction which did not interfere
with tribal sovereignty. By labeling P.L. 280 an act of Congress and thereby nullifying this basis for a state claim to
jurisdiction, the "non-interference with tribal sovereignty"
restriction has also fallen. Since Congress has plenary powers over Indian affairs, its exercise of those powers is not
restricted by any notion of tribal sovereignty. It could, in
its discretion, grant total jurisdiction to the states over Indian affairs or any lesser amount of jurisdiction as it wished.
P.L. 280 on its face is a broad grant of jurisdiction to the
states and contains no explicit embodiment of a restriction
of state jurisdiction comparable to the "non-interference
with sovereignty" limit applicable under Williams v. Lee.
Instead, Congress' only limit on state jurisdiction seems to
exist in those enumerated restrictions of section 1322(b). '
It is in light of the possibility that Congress did not intend
P.L. 280 as a complete grant of jurisdiction to the states and
102. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b)

(1970).
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perhaps not even as a grant of jurisdiction over all matters
other than those few expressly enumerated restrictions in
section 1322(b), that the term "encumbrance" might loom
large as the successor to "tribal sovereignty" as an outside
limit on state assumption of jurisdiction over Indian affairs.

P.L. 280 AND THE STATUS OF TnBAL SovEGNTY
The current approach of the Supreme Court of considering issues of state jurisdiction over Indians in terms of P.L.
280 has modified traditional concepts of sovereignty which
have dominated jurisdiction questions for more than 140
years.
Although it has been argued that no new legal principle
or formulation is necessary to define the limits of state jurisdiction, Kennerly and McClanahan operate to reduce the
significance of the sovereignty concept in the consideration
of such questions and enlarge the role to be played by the
'encumbrance" limitation in P.L. 280.
The traditional sovereignty approach had its beginnings
in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia.0 In that 1832 case, the Court reversed the conviction
of a minister found guilty of being present within Indian
territory without the permission of Georgia state officials.
The Court based its reversal on the doctrine that Indian
tribes constituted "distinct political communities, having
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive ....,"" The Court found that the Cherokees constituted
a separate nation "with boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter. ... ' ...
This basic formulation of the sovereignty principle has
been the primary doctrine utilized to review questions of state
jurisdiction until quite recently."' 6 The Supreme Court de103.
104.
105.
106.

Worcester v. Georgia, 8upre note 81.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 561.
See, e.g., Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); Rice v. Olson, 824 U.S.
786 (1945); United States v. Rickert, 188 US. 432 (1903); Warren Trading
Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
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cisions in Kennerly and McClanahan appear to have modified
traditional concepts of sovereignty and de-emphasized them.
Kennerly modified what would seem to be the plain language of Worcester in holding that Indians could not consent to state jurisdiction except through P.L. 280.' In reviewing the question of the minister who was present on
Indian territory in Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall had
voiced no objection to the presence of non-Indians in Indian
territory so long as the Cherokee had consented.! °8 In fact,
Marshall states that "the citizens of Georgia have no right
to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or
in conformity ... with the acts of congress."' 9 The effect
of Kennerly is that state jurisdiction cannot be had even
with Indian consent, absent compliance with P.L. 280 or
similar acts despite indications to the contrary in Worcester
or other cases.
A more substantial modification of the sovereignty doctrine appears in McClanahan."' It is the clear meaning of
that case that jurisdictional questions will no longer be analyzed in terms of inherent sovereignty, but in terms of congressional acts or authorization. In explaining the new role
of the sovereignty concept, the Court observed:
Finally, the trend has been away from the idea of
inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal preemption.
... The modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on
Platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look
instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which
define the limits of state power."'
Thus the Court further explains that the sovereignty doctrine will no longer provide a "definitive resolution of the
issues" but will serve as "a backdrop against which the applicable treates and federal statutes must be read.""'
Although McClanahanmakes it clear that the Worcester
sovereignty doctrine will no longer be controlling, the opinion
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, supra note 77.
Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 81.
Id. at 561.
McClanahan v. State Tax Conum'n of Arizona, supra note 55.
Id. at 1262.
Id.
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relies on Worcester in establishing the basic policy that state
governments lack jurisdiction over Indian affairs absent
congressional consent."' The Court is also quite definite in
asserting that sovereignty has not been abolished when it
states:
But it would vastly oversimplify the problem
to say that nothing remains of the notion that reservation Indians are a separate people to whom state
jurisdiction, and therefore state tax legislation, may
not extend."'
Despite the Court's insistence that the doctrine of sovereignty exists, it frankly admits that questions of "residual
Indian sovereignty" will be "of little more than theoretical
importance" inasmuch as most cases will be resolved entirely
in terms of the scope of federal jurisdictional grants." 5
The practical consequence of the new approach which
considers sovereignty only as a backdrop is that P.L. 280 and
similar jurisdictional grants from the federal government
will form the battle ground for future jurisdictional wars.
Since P.L. 280 is the only general grant of state jurisdiction
which has been enacted, future controversies are certain to
center on defining the scope of the act.
If limitations are to be imposed on the powers of state
governments over the affairs of Indians under this new approach to jurisdiction, those limitations will arise in the
form of a failure on the part of a given statute to secure P.L.
280 jurisdiction, or by the application of the exclusionary
language provided in that act. Thus, the restrictions on
taxation, alienation and encumbrance have become, in a sense,
a new formulation of sovereigty or at a minimum, a substitute for the sovereignty doctrine.
Although the concept of sovereignty is no longer directly
applicable, the flexibility which was afforded by that general
concept need not disappear. To the extent that courts choose
to employ a broad interpretation of the exclusionary language
of P.L. 280 as in the Snohomish case, they will continue to
113. Id. at 1260.
114. Id. at 1261.
115. Id. at 1262 n.8.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1974

33

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 9 [1974], Iss. 2, Art. 3

454

LAND AND WATEB LAW REVIEW

Vol. IX

exercise control over problems of state jurisdiction. Furthermore, by utilizing such an approach, courts will be able to
adapt jurisdiction answers to the wide variety of state legislation which can raise such questions. If such a judicial approach is implemented, P.L. 280 can serve as an effective
tool for resolving the disputes between Indians and state
governments which are certain to continue to arise.
However, if the very limited approach represented by
the Rhoades case is employed, courts will have little ability
to monitor or influence the continuing problem of state jurisdiction. To the extent that courts restrict themselves to a
narrow view of the P.L. 280 exclusions, they limit their own
ability to review the actions of state government, and preclude themselves from the ability to protect reservation Indians in situations of exercise of unreasonable state power.
Such a narrow construction would operate to sanction a
sweeping grant of jurisdiction to state governments.
Applying these considerations to the question of interpreting "encumbrance," the fundamental question appears
to be whether courts are somehow willing to abdicate protection of Indian lands, conceding to those states which have
adopted P.L. 280 a greater ability to control Indian land
than has heretofore existed under Williams v. Lee or the
sovereignty approach. The Supreme Court decisions in McClanahanand Kennerly do not sanction any such broad grant
to the states, but rather represent a very strict view of state
jurisdiction, albeit in a new form. It would be bitterly ironic
if somehow the Supreme Court's efforts to redefine the
legal basis for denying jurisdiction to the states resulted in
an expansion of state jurisdiction because courts took a
myopic view of the exclusionary language contained in P.L.
280. It would seem apparent then that the efficient functioning of P.L. 280 and the need to preserve a flexible system of adjudication of jurisdictional questions would weigh
heavily in favor of a broad construction of "encumbrance."
CONCLUSION

As the discussion of Williams v. Lee demonstrates, questions of state jurisdiction over Indians have been resolved
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in a generally confused atmosphere in recent years. Properly
interpreted, the more recent Supreme Court cases can serve
to dispel the confusion and lead to a relatively uniform and
simple approach to such questions.
In order to implement such can approach, courts will
have to resist the temptation to rely on Williams v. Lee and
the concept of inherent or residual state power to regulate
Indian land use. Continued reliance on that doctrine is unjustified in light of the discussion presented earlier.
Likewise, courts should no longer use the concept of Indian sovereignty to strike down state jurisdictional efforts.
Although the doctrine has not been abolished, it should not
be the determining element in such questions. Questions of
state jurisdiction are now to be resolved in terms of federal
preemption.
The preemption approach involves two steps. First, it
must be determined whether the state has properly invoked
jurisdiction under P.L. 280. Unless the state has such jurisdiction under P.L. 280 or one of the more limited jurisdictional grants, the state is entirely without power to act.
Second, assuming that jurisdiction has been properly invoked
under P.L. 280 it must be determined whether the act in
question is within the scope of P.L. 280. That is, it must be
determined whether the act attempts to do that which is forbidden through the exclusionary language of P.L. 280. It is at
this second step that the nature of the encumbrance exclusion will be determined.
The policies and precedents which have been reviewed
to this point indicate that a broad construction of the term
"encumbrance" would be desirable. The broad definition
insures continued judicial scrutiny of a serious and continuing problem, and provides a flexible tool to be used by courts
to fairly adjust the interests of Indians in their own autonomy with the interests of state government in controlling
Indian lands. A broad definition would afford an opportunity to develop the law in relation to the extremely varied
issues which will arise on a case-by-case basis.
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Although such a broad view of "encumbrance"

is some-

what at odds with the termination history of P.L. 280, such
an interpretation would provide for more consistency with
current governmental policy. Such a view would also be
appropriate in terms of consistency with interpretations of
the taxing and fishing exclusions. The discussion of the definitional aspects of the terms presents further reasons for
adopting the broad view.
In the last analysis it is apparent that P.L. 280, along
with its encumbrance and other restrictions, occupies the
position which formerly belonged to the sovereignty doctrine. This shift in legal approach can lead to a less complex,
but equally effective procedure for resolving jurisdictional
questions. The flexibility of the sovereignty doctrine can be
preserved while at the same time the confusion of Williams
v. Lee is removed, provided that the broad view is adopted
Whether such an approach will be taken remains to be seen.
PATRICK E. HACKR
DENNIS C. MEIER
DAN J.
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